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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the multi-user setting both in public and in
secret-key cryptanalytic applications. In this setting, the adversary tries to recover keys
of many users in parallel more efficiently than with classical attacks, i.e., the number of
recovered keys multiplied by the time complexity to find a single key, by amortizing the
cost among several users. One possible scenario is to recover a single key in a large set
of users more efficiently than to recover a key in the classical model. Another possibility
is, after some shared precomputation, to be able to learn individual keys very efficiently.
This latter model is close to traditional time/memory tradeoff attacks with precompu-
tation. With these goals in mind, we introduce two new algorithmic ideas to improve
collision-based attacks in the multi-user setting. Both ideas are derived from the paral-
lelizable collision search as proposed by van Oorschot and Wiener. This collision search
uses precomputed chains obtained by iterating some basic function. In our cryptanalytic
application, each pair of merging chains can be used to correlate the key of two distinct
users. The first idea is to construct a graph, whose vertices are keys and whose edges
are these correlations. When the graph becomes connected, we simultaneously recover
all the keys. Thanks to random graph analysis techniques, we can show that the num-
ber of edges that are needed to make this event occurs is small enough to obtain some
improved attacks. The second idea modifies the basic technique of van Oorschot and
Wiener: instead of waiting for two chains to merge, we now require that they become
parallel.
We first show that, using the first idea alone, we can recover the discrete logarithms of
L users in a group of size N in time O˜(
√
NL). We put these two ideas together and we
show that in the multi-user Even-Mansour scheme, all the keys of L = N1/3 users can
be found with N1/3+ǫ queries for each user (where N is the domain size). Finally, we
consider the PRINCE block cipher (with 128-bit keys and 64-bit blocks) and find the
keys of 2 users among a set of 232 users in time 265. We also describe a new generic attack
in the classical model for PRINCE.
1 Introduction
The multi-user setting is a very interesting practical scenario, which is sometimes overlooked in
cryptography. Indeed, cryptosystems are designed to be used by many users, and usually cryp-
tographers prove the security of their schemes in a single-user model except in some cases such
∗ c© IACR 2014. This article is the full version of the paper submitted by the authors to the IACR
and to Springer-Verlag on 14/09/2014, to appear in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2014.
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as key exchange, public-key encryption and signatures. At EUROCRYPT 2012, Menezes [22]
gave an invited talk pointing out the discrepancy between security proofs for message authen-
tication code in the single-user and in the multi-user setting. As it was already been pointed
out in [11], he showed that there is a straightforward reduction between the security proof for
one user and the security proof for L users with a success probability divided by L. Next, he
recalled the key collision attack due to Biham [3] that matches this bound and that can be
applied on various deterministic MACs (CMAC, SIV, OCB, EME, . . . ). In this attack, the
adversary asks the MAC tag of a single message M for L different users; we call this the set of
secret MACs. Then, for a subset W of size N/L of known keys (N is the key size), he computes
MAC(k,M) for all k ∈W and builds the set of public MACs. If a collision occurs between the
public and secret sets, then we learn one of the L secret keys.4 For MAC schemes with an 80-bit
security level, it is possible with time/memory tradeoff to make this reasonably practical and
derive a key recovery of a single key among a set of L = 220 users, using time and memory 240.
Menezes thus insists that cryptographers have to consider this practical setting when devising
or analyzing cryptosystems. For more results on multi-user attacks, the reader can also refer
to [4].
In this paper, we are interested in collision-based attacks [26] in the multi-user setting.
We rely on the distinguished point technique to propose new attacks on the generic discrete
logarithm problem, on the Even-Mansour cipher and on PRINCE. Collision-based methods
have been nicely improved by van Oorschot and Wiener to become parallelizable using the
distinguished point technique of Rivest and Quisquater and Delescaille [24]. Here, we extend
these methods and apply them to cryptanalysis in the multi-user setting.
Our Contributions. From a cryptanalytic point of view, there are many ways to perform
attacks in the multi-user setting. In this paper, we are interested by several scenarios. The
first option is to recover all the users’ keys (or a large fraction thereof) in time less than the
product of the number of users by the time complexity to recover one key. Another direction
is to improve Biham’s attack and recover a single key in the multi-user setting with a reduced
memory cost. Finally, we consider time/memory attacks starting with a precomputation whose
result can then be used later to recover individual keys much faster.
Giant connected component. The multi-user setting for the discrete logarithm problem has been
studied by Kuhn and Struik in [19]. They show that it is possible to adapt the parallel version
of the Pollard rho technique with distinguished points to recover L keys in time
√
NL where
N is the size of the group as long as L ≪ 4√N . In the parallel version of Pollard rho method
described by van Oorschot and Wiener, (see App. C) we run random walks in parallel, stop
them once a distinguished point is reached and store this value for many starting points. We get
a public set of distinguished points for the walks that begin at ya = g
a for which we know a and
a secret set from a user public key y for starting points ygb where b is known. Kuhn and Struik
generalize this method by using many secret sets, one for each user. Once a distinguished point
appears twice in the public and secret sets, the discrete logarithm of one user can be discovered,
and consequently, we also know the discrete logarithm of all the distinguished points that were
discovered during the random walks for this user. Therefore, as the number of “known” points
increases, the probability of a collision between a secret point and a known one becomes higher.
Similar results can be found in [21, 1, 2].
Here, we show another method that works without any restriction on L and keeps the
symmetry between all read points. Indeed, we do not have to wait until the first collision
4Provided that the tag length is greater than the key length.
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between a public point and a secret one happens, but we also consider collisions between secret
points. More precisely, as soon as a collision between the public walks and the secret walks
happens, we learn many discrete logarithms, since when two secret chains collide, we learn the
difference between the discrete logarithm. We can then construct a graph whose vertices are
the users and we add an edge if we know the difference of the discrete logarithm between these
users. At some point, when the number of edges becomes slightly larger than the users, a giant
component emerges in our random graph and if the public user is in this component (with high
probability in time 2L lnL), then the discrete logarithm of all users will be known.
Our method has an advantage towards the method proposed by Kuhn and Struik as we use
parallelism extensively. However, a disadvantage is that in our case we do not learn any discrete
logarithms until the very end, when a giant component appears in the graph. In contrast, Kuhn
and Struik’s algorithm is sequential and so they find each discrete logarithm one after the other.
Overall, the main goal of section 2 is to provide an educational example of the graph connexity
approach and show that it is much simpler to analyze.
Lambda Method for two different Even-Mansour style functions. We were also able to apply
similar techniques on Even-Mansour with domain size N . Indeed, using some functions related
to the encryption scheme, we show that we can learn the Xor between the keys of two users. The
previous technique can also be used to recover the keys of all users. However, in this case, we
get a new problem: the two functions we iterate are no longer the same. Consequently, contrary
to the DL case, once a collision appears, the chains will no longer merge and we cannot use
distinguished point technique. To solve this issue, we tweak the two functions and define related
functions that will no longer merge but become parallel. We show that this parallel method is
as efficient as the previous one. For instance, we show an attack that partially solves an open
problem of Dunkelman et al. that asked to find a memoryless attack on Even-Mansour with D
queries to the secret function and T = N/D to the public function with D ≪ √N . We propose
an attack that matches these bounds (D = N2/5, T = N3/5) but where the memory is N1/5 as
an application of our lambda-method. Furthermore, we also describe a multi-user attack which
allows to learn all the keys in a set of N1/3 users in data complexity N1/3+ǫ to each user and
T = N1/3+ǫ time complexity by combining the two algorithmic tools. This attack exhibits new
tradeoff where the amortized data complexity per user times the time complexity is reduced to
N2/3+ǫ instead of N .
Application to PRINCE. PRINCE cipher [8] is a new block cipher recently introduced at ASI-
ACRYPT 2012 with blocklength 64 bits and keylength 128 bits. Its design has a α-reflection
property which is a related-key relation that transforms the decryption algorithm to the en-
cryption process with a related-key. Here, we propose generic attacks on the full number of
rounds. At FSE 2014 [9], an attack on 10 rounds of PRINCE has been presented, with time
complexity 260.7 and data complexity 257.94. In [16], an attack with slightly less than 2128 al-
lows to break all the rounds, but our attacks have a particular low time complexity. They are
similar to the one on Even-Mansour but we have to take into account that in PRINCE, the
internal permutation uses a secret key. They make use both of the α-reflection property and of
the specific key scheduling of PRINCE, i.e. the relationship between the two whitening keys.
The first attack allows to recover the keys of two users among a set of 232 users in time 265
and the second one allows to recover the keys of all users in time 232 after a precomputation
of time 296 and 264 in memory. Finally, we do not contradict the security bound showed in the
original paper, but we show that different tradeoffs are possible.
Organization of the paper. In section 2, we present our results on the discrete logarithm
problem in the multi-user setting and we use the properties of random graph in this setting.
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Then, we present various results concerning the security of Even-Mansour: new time/memory/data
(denoted T/M/D) tradeoffs, new time/memory (denoted T/M) attack solving the open prob-
lem of Dunkelman et al. and in the multi-user setting. In this part, we show how we can adapt
the lambda-method when searching for collisions for two different functions based on the Even-
Mansour idea. Finally, in the last section, we present various generic attacks on the PRINCE
block cipher, one in the multi-user setting and the other in the classical model.
2 Discrete Logarithms in the Multi-User Setting
In this section, we present a new algorithmic idea for performing T/M attacks with distinguished
points in the multi-users setting. Our technique allows to compute the discrete logarithms of
L public keys yi = g
xi for i = 1, . . . , L in time5 O˜(
√
NL) for any value of L where N = |〈g〉|.
Starting from the parallel version of Pollard rho method [26], we compute cL/2 chains consisting
of pseudo-random walks from yi (c/2 chains for each user by randomizing the starting point)
until we discover a distinguished point di ∈ S0 where S0 denotes the set of distinguished points6.
Then, all distinguished points found are sorted and each collision between the distinguished
points of different users di and dj reveals a linear relation between xi and xj . We also compute
a few chains starting from random points for which the discrete logarithm is known gx0 . Finally,
we construct the random graph where the vertices are the public keys and we add an edge
between yi and yj if we have a collision between di and dj (this process can be described more
formally using a random graph processas it is recalled in Appendix A). This edge is labelled
with the linear relation between xi and xj . Once we have computed a sufficient number of
collisions, a small constant time the number of users, then a giant component will appear with
high probability. More precisely, in a graph with L vertices and cL/2 randomly placed edges
with c > 1, there is a giant component whose size is almost exactly (1− t(c))L, (see [7]recalled
in Appendix A) where:
t(c) =
1
c
∞∑
k=1
kk−1(ce−c)k
k!
.
For c = 4, we get 1− t(c) = 0.98. The discrete logarithm of all the points in the component of
the x0’s are known. If we want to recover the discrete logarithm of all users with overwhelming
probability, we need 2L lnL edges to connect all connected components according to the coupon
collectors problem and not cL/2, as it is recalled in Theorem 2(see Appendix A).
Let ℓ the average length of the chains and S0 the set of distinguished points. The average
length of each chain is ℓ = N/|S0|. Assume we have computed i chains that do not collide, the
probability that the (i + 1)th chain collides with one of the previous is iℓ × ℓ/N(according to
Theorem 3 in Appendix A for the expected number of collisions between two pseudo-random
walks). Consequently, the expected number of collisions Coll is:
E[Coll] =
L−1∑
i=1
iℓ2
N
≈ L
2
2
· ℓ
2
N
=
L2
2
· (N/|S0|)
2
N
=
L2N
2|S0|2 .
We want the number of collisions to be larger than cL/2, which implies L2N/2|S0|2 ≥ cL/2,
thus |S0| ≤
√
LN/c. Consequently, the overall cost is dominated by the computation of the
chains, i.e. L×N/|S0| which is about
√
cLN if |S0| =
√
LN/c. Finally, in order to have cL/2
edges in our graph, each user has to compute a small number of chains using a small number
5The O˜ notation hides logarithmic terms.
6This algorithm can also be adapted to the Pollard-lambda algorithm [23].
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of random input points of the form gxi+ri for known value of ri. The overall complexity of our
attack is O˜(
√
NL) for any value of L while Kuhn and Struik analysis achieves the value
√
2LN
for L≪ 4√N .
Another possible approach to analyze known, unknown points and collisions between them
would be to use a matrix. For this, we consider a symmetric matrix M where M [i, j] repre-
sents the linear relation between the discrete logarithms of i and j. Then we apply a random
variable in order to sparsify the matrix. More precisely, we multiply the coefficient (i, j) of the
matrix by 1 with probability p and by 0 with probability (1 − p), where these probabilities
are independent. When we multiply by 1, that means, that we know the differences between
the discrete logarithms of i and j.The question then becomes how many rows (with 2 non-zero
coefficients) do we need to achieve full column-rank, which naturally leads to the same results:
O(L ∗ log(L)). However, when considering rows with O(log(L)) non-zero coefficients, we only
needs O(L) rows. This would imply that for multi-user discrete logarithms the overall complex-
ity can be reduced by a factor log(L) to O(sqrt(L ∗N)) by spending a factor log(L) more work
in generating starting points of random combinations of log(L) known/unknown points (e.g.,
see [12]). We choose to analyze the complexity in the same form as Wiener and van Oorschot
which is usually the case for crypto papers, i.e we do not care on the logN factors that arise
in such birthday algorithms. Indeed, the Kuhn and Struik algorithm hides also a log(N) factor
in order to get collisions with very high probability because a 1/2 probability is not sufficient
since we need many collisions of this type.
3 Even-Mansour in the Single and Multi-User Settings
3.1 Brief description of Even-Mansour
At Asiacrypt 1991, Even and Mansour in [15] describe a very efficient design (called EM in
the following) to construct a block cipher, i.e. a keyed permutation family ΠK1,K2 from a large
permutation π. The key K1 is first xored with the plaintext, then the fixed permutation is
applied and finally the key K2 is xored to obtain the final value.
ΠK1,K2(P ) = π(P ⊕K1)⊕K2.
Their main result is a security proof that any attack that uses D on-line plaintext/ciphertext
pairs (queries to Π) and T off-line computations (queries to π) must satisfy DT = N, where
N = 2n with n the size of the plaintext and key and which will be called the EM curve. The
important part of the proof is that it is a lower bound for all attacks including known-plaintext
attacks. It appears that the use of two keys K1 and K2 does not add much more resistance to
the scheme. This variant of using K = K1 = K2 has been proposed under the name Single-Key
Even-Mansour and we denote it by ΠK . The security of this minimal version has been proved
secure with the same bound as for the two-key version by Dunkelman et al. This minimal version
is amazingly resistant and guarantees the same security bound, but it is not unexpected since
usually the attacks look for the two keys independently and once the key K1 is recovered, there
is no security for K2. In the following, we see that the two-key version does not improve the
security since most of the attacks on the single-key can be levered to this version.
In this section, we describe new results concerning the security of the Even-Mansour scheme
which has recently been the subject of many papers [14, 20]. We recall the basic attacks and then,
we present a basic T/M tradeoff for known plaintext attacks with better on-line complexity
(Sect. 3.3) and a better T/M tradeoff for adaptive queries (Sect. 3.4). For this attack, we
introduce our second algorithmic trick to discover collisions for two different functions based on
the Even-Mansour construction. The main difficulty we have to solve is that when a lambda-like
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method is used to recover collisions, if two different functions are used, after the collision, the
chain will no longer merge. To this end, we adapt the lambda-method to have parallel chains
when the collision happens. Finally, we show that in the multi-user setting (Sect. 3.5) the
precomputation cost can be amortized. It is possible to balance all the complexities to recover
all the keys of N1/3 users with N1/3+ǫ adaptive queries to each user, a precomputation time of
N1/3+ǫ and the attack requires N1/3+ǫ in memory and N1/3+ǫ for the on-line time.
3.2 Previous attacks on Even-Mansour
In [13], Daemen showed that the EM curve TD = N , is valid for a known plaintext attack at
the point (T = N/2, D = 2). He also gave a chosen-plaintext attack that matches the EM curve
for any value of D and T and in particular at the point (T = N1/2, D = N1/2). Later, Biryukov
and Wagner described a sliding attack that matches the EM curve for known-plaintext but only
at the point (T = N1/2, D = N1/2)(See Appendix B for more details about previous attacks).
Recently, Dunkelman et al. introduce a new twist on the sliding attack whose complexities
match the whole curve for any value of D and T using a known-plaintext attack which is
exactly the result proved by Even and Mansour. Finally, Dunkelman et al. also provide a slidex
attack on the two-key Even-Mansour scheme.
Simpler collision-based attack on the Single-Key Even-Mansour. In the single-key case a simpler
attack achieves the same performance. The basic idea is to apply the Davies-Meyer construction
to Π and to π. More precisely, write:
FΠ(x) = Π(x)⊕x and Fπ(x) = π(x)⊕x.
For any value of x, the equality FΠ(x) = Fπ(x⊕K) is satisfied. Moreover, any collision between
these two functions FΠ(x) = Fπ(y) indicates that x⊕y is a likely candidate for the key K.
With this idea in mind, the problem of attacking the single key Even-Mansour scheme is
reduced to the problem of finding a collision (or rather a few collisions) between FΠ and Fπ.
The simplest approach is simply to compute Fπ on T distinct random values and FΠ on D
distinct random values. When DT ≈ N , one expects to find the required collisions.
Moreover, this can be done in a more efficient way by using classical collision search algo-
rithms with reduced memory. Indeed, it is possible to use Floyd’s cycle finding algorithm to
obtain such a solution for the special case D = T = N1/2, without using memory. However, in
this case the attack is no longer a known-plaintext attack and becomes an adaptively chosen
plaintext attack.
Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir ask whether it is possible to generalize this and to find
memoryless attacks using D queries to Π and N/D to π where D ≪ N1/2 ?
In this paper, we partially answer this question, proposing attacks that use less than
D ≪ N1/2 data and memory lower than min(T,D) if we require the unkeyed queries to be
precomputed. Without this requiring, we achieve a memoryless attack.
3.3 Extending the simple attack
Dealing with two keys Even-Mansour. A first important remark is that the simple attack on
Single-Key EM can be extended to the two-key case. The idea is simply to replace the function
π(x)⊕x by another function with similar properties. A first requirement is that the chosen
function needs to be expressed by two different formulas, one based on π and the other on Π.
The other requirement is that a collision on two evaluations, one of each type, should yield
good candidates for the keys.
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We now construct the required function and show that the simple attack on the single-key
variant can be extended to two keys. We first choose a random non-zero constant δ and let:
FΠ(x) = Π(x)⊕Π(x⊕δ) and Fπ(x) = π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ).
We remark that FΠ(x) = Fπ(x⊕K1) and that FΠ(x⊕δ) = Fπ(x⊕K1) are both satisfied. As a
consequence, every collision now suggests two distinct input keys K1 = x⊕y and K1 = x⊕y⊕δ.
Except for this detail, the attack remains unchanged. Note that once K1 has been found,
recovering K2 is a trivial matter.
Reducing the on-line time complexity. In this section, we focus on known-plaintext attacks
and we first show that the EM security model does not separate the on-line and off-line time
complexities, as usually done in T/M/D tradeoff. It is then possible to use T/M/D tradeoff for
this blockcipher design as suggested in [5] by Biryukov and Shamir.
Let us separate the on-line time denoted by Ton and the off-line time denoted by Toff . Clearly,
the total time complexity T is Ton + Toff .
The main idea of this section is to use a different approach to find a collision between
FΠ and Fπ. More precisely, given a value of FΠ , we try to invert Fπ on this value. If we
succeed, we clearly obtain the desired collision. In order to inverse Fπ, we rely on Hellman’s
algorithm(recalled in Appendix D). The T/M/D tradeoff is
TonM
2D2 = N2 and D2 ≤ Ton ≤ N.
In order to fully use Hellman tradeoff with multiple tables, we can use the δ in the definition
of the function Fπ(x) = π(x)⊕ π(x⊕ δ) to define different and independent functions for each
table. These attacks achieve TonD ≪ N while TD = N .
Using less data than memory. Despite its optimal efficiency in term of known-plaintext attack
matching the EM curve, the Slidex attack presents an important drawback. Indeed, the public
permutation π needs to be evaluated at points which depend on the result of the queries to
the keyed Even-Mansour construction Π. As a consequence, with this attack, it is not possible
to precompute the queries to π in order to improve the online time required to obtain the key
to Π.
Our previous attack based on Hellman’s tables no longer requires adaptive queries, however,
it is less costly than the Slidex attack in term of on-line time complexity but more costly than
the simple collision-based attack (which uses adaptive chosen plaintext). The goal of the next
subsection is to present an attack on Π, which is based on classical collision search algorithms
and works by using queries to π and Π without any cross-dependencies. However, the queries
to Π are adaptive but this new attack is more flexible to perform T/M tradeoff.
3.4 Time/Memory/Data tradeoff attack on Even-Mansour
Attacking Even-Mansour using distinguished points methods. In order to attack Even-Mansour
using a distinguished point methodas recalled in Appendix C, we would like to construct a
set of chains using the public permutation π and then find a collision with a chain obtained
from the keyed permutation Π. One difficulty is that chains computing from π and from Π
can never merge since they are based on different functions contrary to discrete logarithm
section. We introduce here a new idea to solve this dilemma when the functions are based on
the Even-Mansour construction. Let us define:
FΠ(x) = x⊕Π(x)⊕Π(x⊕δ) and Fπ(x) = x⊕π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ).
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We remark that FΠ(x⊕K1) = Fπ(x)⊕K1. As a consequence, two chains based on FΠ and
Fπ cannot merge, but they may become parallel. Indeed, using the equation FΠ(x⊕K1) =
Fπ(x)⊕K1 and let two points X and x such that X = x⊕K1, where X (resp. x) belongs to an
FΠ chain (resp. x belongs to an Fπ chain), the next element Y = FΠ(X) in the FΠ chain and
the next element y = Fπ(x) in the Fπ chain will satisfy:
Y = FΠ(X) = FΠ(x⊕K1) = Fπ(x)⊕K1 = y⊕K1.
So Y = y⊕K1, which means that Y and y satisfy the same relation as X and x, and so on.
Therefore, as soon as by chance X = x⊕K1 where X is an element of an FΠ chain and x is
an element of an Fπ chain, the same relation remains with the subsequent points of the two
chains, i.e. we get two parallel chains.
Moreover, the detection of this good event is compatible with the distinguished point
method. Indeed, it suffices to define a distinguished point x as a point with a value of π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ)
in S0. Similarly, for chains constructed by using FΠ , we define a distinguished point X as a
point with a value of Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) in S0. Now if X = x⊕K1 and x is a distinguished point
in a π chain, then since
Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) = π(X⊕K1)⊕π(X⊕K1⊕δ) = π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ),
the point X is also a distinguished point in the Π chain, and therefore X⊕x gives a candidate
for K1. Since the values π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ) and Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) are needed to compute the next
element in the chains, using this definition does not add any extra cost for distinguished point
detection. The important point, is that for a parallel chain based on FΠ , a point X = x⊕K1
corresponds to a distinguished point x if and only if Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) is in S0.
An important difference compared to the classical search for collisions is that we do not
need to backtrack to the beginning of the chains and identify where the chains merge. Indeed,
seeing parallel distinguished points suffices to get candidates values for K1.
Analysis of the attack with precomputation. Since there is a clear symmetry between the keyed
and unkeyed queries, we may assume that the number of unkeyed queries T is larger than the
number of keyed queries D. Let BT the number of unkeyed chains to increase the probability of
a collision between keyed and unkeyed chains. Moreover, this is the most reasonable scenario,
since keyed queries are usually the most constrained resource. In this case, we need to choose
the expected length ℓ of the chains we are going to construct and BT that satisfy the following
relations:
T = ℓ ·BT and N = BT ℓ2.
Thus, ℓ = N/T and BT = T
2/N . The required memory to store those chains is of size O(BT ).
After terminating the computation of the unkeyed chains, we can turn to the keyed side.
On this side, we want to perform about D = N/T evaluations of the function. Since D = ℓ, this
means that we compute a single keyed chain and expect it to (parallel) collide with an unkeyed
chain.
We are interested in values for M such that M < D. Consequently, as M = T/D = N/D2,
we have N < D3. Let us consider N1/3 < D = Nα < N1/2. For example, if D = N2/5 and
T = N3/5, then M = N1/5 is much smaller than N2/5. This attack requires a number of data
D ≪ N1/2 and despite this attack is not memoryless (as in the open problem), the memory is
less than the data.
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Relaxing the precomputation requirement. Another alternative7 is to perform the same attack
while computing the keyed queries before the unkeyed ones. In this case, since there is a single
keyed chain to be stored, we can achieve the attack using a constant amount of memory.
Moreover, this variation works for any D = Nα ≤ N1/2 using T = N/D.
3.5 Attacks in the multi-user setting
In the multi-user setting, we assume that L different users are all using the Even-Mansour
scheme based on the same public permutation π, with each user having its own key8, chosen
uniformly at random and independently from the keys of the other users.
Of course, the attack from Section 3.4 can be easily applied in this context. Depending on
the exact goal of the cryptanalysis, we have two main options:
1. If the goal is to recover the key of all users, the previous attack can be applied by repeating
the D key-dependent queries for each user, while amortizing the T unkeyed queries across
users. A typical case is to consider L = N1/3 users, to perform T = N2/3+ǫ unkeyed queries
(N1/3+ǫ chains of N1/3 queries, memory N1/3). For each new user, we need N1/3+ǫ key-
dependent queries. As a consequence, the amortized cost per user (up to constant factors
c0 = 20) is N
1/3+ǫ queries of each type and the required memory also is N1/3.
2. If the goal of the cryptanalyst is to obtain at least one user key among all the users, it
suffices to split the D key-dependent queries arbitrarily across the users.
However, we present in this section a much more efficient tradeoff in the multi-user set-
ting. This tradeoff becomes possible without precomputation in N2/3, but by distributing the
unkeyed queries among the users and by reusing the graph algorithmic idea of the section 2.
For this, we construct a graph whose vertices are labelled by the users. Whenever we obtain
a collision FΠ
(i)(x) = FΠ
(j)(y) for users i and j, we add an edge between the corresponding
vertices labelled with x ⊕ y which is expected equal to K(i) ⊕ K(j). Note that this indicates
that we know the exclusive-or of the first keys of the two users.
If we have L vertices and cL/2 randomly edges with c = 4, there is a giant component
whose size is 98% of the points, and with cL lnL, all the points are in this component with
overwhelming probability(see Theorems 1 and 2 in Appendix A). Consequently, we obtain the
exclusive-or of the first keys for an arbitrary pair of users. To conclude the attack, it suffices to
find a single collision between any of the users functions FΠ of the large connected component
and the unkeyed function Fπ to reveal all the keys of these users.
Algorithm Description.
1. Create a constant number c/2 of chains for each user up to a distinguished point.
2. Sort the distinguished points.
3. Bring together the distinguished points into subsets, where we test whether the key candi-
date is really the good one. It is indeed easy to check with a few more queries if the xor of
two keys is correct.
4. Construct the giant component and expect that the public user (the user with the unkeyed
function), lies in this giant component. To this end, we initially begin with the set of
reachable users containing only the public user. Then, we add to this set all the users that
are in a group where a reachable user is present. At some point, the reachable set is stable
and we stop.
7We thank an anonymous reviewer of Asiacrypt 2014 for pointing this out.
8Or key-pair depending on whether we are considering the single or dual key scheme.
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5. From the public user, we cross over the giant component and determine the keys of each
user.
The first step requires cLℓ/2 data and time O(cℓ) on average per user where ℓ is the average
length of the chains. Then, the remaining steps are performed in time linear in the number
of users L. Typical parameters are: for an arbitrary small positive constant c, we expect with
N1/3 users, c · N1/3 queries per user and N1/3 unkeyed queries, to recover almost all the
N1/3 keys with overwhelming probability. If we want to recover all users, we need to have
L lnL = cN1/3 lnN = N1/3+ǫ edges (instead of cL/2) to connect all components according to
the coupon collector’s problemrecalled in Theorem 2 in Appendix.
Analysis of the attack. We want to use results from graph theory to prove the correctness of
our algorithm, this means that we have to prove that the assumptions of the giant component
theorem are satisfied. We have to show that we construct of a random graph according to the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model of random graphs, in which each possible edge connecting pairs of a given
set of L vertices is present, independently of the other edges, with probability p. In this case,
we know that with this model of random graph, if the number of edges c.L/2 is larger than the
number of vertices L, there is with high probability a single giant component, with all other
components having size O(logL) according to [7](also recalled in Theorem 1 in Appendix).
Consequently, we need to prove that we construct a random graph and that the edges are
added independently of each others. We will define an idealized version of the attack and we
will show that the attack works in this version. Then, we will prove that the idealized version
and the attack are equivalent using simulation argument.
In the idealized model, the simulator randomly chooses L keys K1, . . . ,KL uniformly at
random. Then it iterates the functions F
(i)
Π (x) = Ki⊕Fπ(x⊕Ki) until xℓ⊕Ki ∈ S0, where S0
is the set of pairs containing a distinguished point di and an identificator of this point id(di).
The identificators are unique, which means that we do not have collision on them. Finally, the
simulator reveals the identificator of the point xℓ ⊕Ki and the point xℓ. The value Ki cannot
be recovered from the information that the simulator returns.
To show that the attack works in this ideal model, we just have to see that if two users have
the same identificator, then xℓ ⊕Ki = xℓ′ ⊕Kj and therefore xℓ ⊕ xℓ′ = Ki ⊕Kj which is the
same information as in the real attack.
Now, we will prove that the simulator does not need to know F
(i)
Π and can simulate the
information by only using the public random function Fπ and that the distribution of its outputs
is indistinguishable from the idealized model. The simulator generates at random L random keys
for the EM scheme. For each key, we will show that the pairs distinguished point/identificator
can be generated only using Fπ. Indeed, xℓ the ℓth iteration of F
(i)
Π with key Ki from the value
x0 is the value Ki⊕xℓ and this value is also the result of the iteration of the public function Fπ
from the value x0⊕Ki. Consequently, to generate the pairs (distinguished point, identificator),
the simulator can compute (xℓ ⊕Ki, id(xℓ)) without interacting with the users. As in this last
case, the pairs are generated at random without interacting and knowing the function and since
the function Fπ are random, the edges in the graph are added at random and independently
of each others and so that the graph is a random graph according to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph
model.
Experimental results. We implement the previous attacks on an Even-Mansour cryptosystem
using the DES with a fixed key and n = 64. We simulate 222 users and for each user we create
8 chains (80 for the public user). We use distinguished points containing 21 zeroes and so the
expected length is 221 on average. We bound the length of the chains to 224, this means that if
we remove the chain if we have not seen a distinguished point after 224 evaluations. In all, we
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have generated 33, 543, 077 chains (225 = 33, 554, 432, it misses the abandoned chains) and the
number of groups containing at least two parallel chains is 4, 109, 961. Experimentally, the size
of the giant component contains 3, 788, 059 users (among the 4, 194, 304) and so we can deduce
the keys of 90% of the users. This result is what is expected from theory since the number of
vertices in this experiment is below the number of nodes. The 98% that is previously given as
result in section 3.5, would require twice as many vertices.
The time to generate the chains is 1600 sec using 4096 cores in parallel and the analysis of
the graph requires a few minutes on a standard PC.
4 Attacks on the PRINCE cipher in the Multi-User and Classical
Setting
PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher published at ASIACRYPT 2012 [8]. It is based on the
FX construction [18] which is actually an Even-Mansour like construction. PRINCE has been
the interest of many cryptanalysts [10, 25, 16] who attack either the full cipher, or its reduced
version.
The designers of PRINCE claim that its security is ensured up to 2127−n operations when
an adversary acquires 2n plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This bound has been reduced in [16] to
2126 operations with a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. After a brief presentation of PRINCE,
we describe a generic attack in the multi-user setting that allow to recover the key of a pair
of users in a set of 232 users with complexity 264 computations. The identification of the pair
of users uses the idea similar to the attack on Even-Mansour. However, details are different
since PRINCE is not an Even-Mansour scheme as the internal permutation uses a secret key.
Finally, we present another generic attack in the classical model that after a precomputation
of 296 time and 264 in memory, allows to recover the key of every single user in time 232. Both
attacks work for all rounds of PRINCE.
4.1 Brief description of PRINCE
PRINCE [8] uses a 64-bit block and a 128-bit key which is split into two equal parts of 64 bits, i.e.
k = k0‖k1. In order to extend the key to 192 bits it uses the mapping k = (k0‖k1)→ (k0‖k′0‖k1)
where k
′
0 is derived from k0 by using a linear function L
′:
L′(k0) = (k0≫ 1)⊕ (k0 ≫ 63),
where≫ denotes the right shift and≫ the rotation of a 64-bit word. While subkeys k0 and k′0
are used as input and output whitening keys, the 64-bit key k1 is used for the 12-round internal
block cipher which is called PRINCEcore. For simplicity, we refer to it as the core of PRINCE
or simply the core function and we denote it by Pcore. So every plaintext P is transformed
into the corresponding ciphertext C by using the function Ek(P ) = k
′
0⊕Pcorek1(P ⊕k0) where
Pcore uses the key k1 (see Fig.1).
m
k0
PRINCEcore
k1
c
k
′
0
Fig. 1. Structure of PRINCE
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The core function consists of a key k1 addition, a round constant (RC0) addition, five
forward rounds, a middle round, five backward rounds and finally a round constant (RC11) and
a key k1 addition. The full schedule of the core is shown in Fig. 2.
k1 RC0
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 S M
′
S
−1 R
−1
6 R
−1
7 R
−1
8 R
−1
9 R
−1
10
RC11 k1
S M
k1RCi k1 RCi
M
−1
S
−1
Fig. 2. Structure of the core of PRINCE
Each forward round of the core is composed by a 4-bit Sbox layer (S), a linear layer (64×64
matrix M), an addition of a round constant RCi for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} and the addition of the key
k1. The linear M layer is defined as M = SR ◦M ′ where SR is the following permutation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 −→ 0 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 1 6 11
TheM
′
layer, which is only used in the middle rounds, can be seen as a mirror in the middle
of the core as the 5 backward rounds are defined as the inverse of the 5 forward rounds.
In every RCi-add step, a 64-bit round constant is XORed with the state. It should be
noted that RCi ⊕ RC11−i = α = 0xc0ac29b7c97c50dd for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 11. From this, but also
from the fact that the matrix M
′
is an involution, we can perform the decryption function of
PRINCE by simply performing the encryption procedure with inverse order of keys k0 and k
′
0
and by using the key k1 ⊕ α instead of k1. That means, that for any key (k0‖k′0‖k1), we have
D(k0‖k′0‖k1)
(·) = E(k′0‖k0‖k1⊕α)(·). This property is called the α-reflection property of PRINCE.
4.2 Attack on PRINCE in the multi-user setting
In the multi-user setting, we assume that we have L different users which are all using the
block cipher PRINCE. Each user Ui with 0 ≤ i < L, chooses her key k(i) = k(i)0 ‖k(i)1 at random
and independently from all the other users. In order to attack PRINCE using the distinguished
point method, we first construct a set of chains for every user using the function of PRINCE.
For this, we use the function defined as follows:
F
k
(i)
0 ,k
′(i)
0 ,k
(i)
1
(x) = x⊕ PRINCE
k
(i)
0 ,k
′(i)
0 ,k
(i)
1
(x)⊕ PRINCE
k
(i)
0 ,k
′(i)
0 ,k
(i)
1
(x⊕ δ)
where δ is an arbitrary but fixed non zero constant. The key k
′(i)
0 vanishes from the equation
and the function F thus takes the following form:
F
k
(i)
1
(x) = x⊕ Pcore
k
(i)
1
(x⊕ k(i)0 )⊕ Pcorek(i)1 (x⊕ k
(i)
0 ⊕ δ).
For every user Ui, we create one encryption (E) chain and one decryption (D) chain which
are both based on the function F defined above. E uses the encryption function of PRINCE
whereas D uses the decryption function. And so, for the user Ui, we define functions E and D
as follows:
E
k
(i)
0 ,k
(i)
1
(x
(i)
j ) = x
(i)
j+1 = x
(i)
j ⊕ Pcorek(i)1 (x
(i)
j ⊕ k(i)0 )⊕ Pcorek(i)1 (x
(i)
j ⊕ k(i)0 ⊕ δ)
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D
k
′(i)
0 ,k
(i)
1 ⊕α
(y
(i)
j ) = y
(i)
j+1
= y
(i)
j ⊕ Pcorek(i)1 ⊕α(y
(i)
j ⊕ k
′(i)
0 )⊕ Pcorek(i)1 ⊕α(y
(i)
j ⊕ k
′(i)
0 ⊕ δ).
Let us define:
fE = Pcore
k
(i)
1
(x
(i)
j ⊕ k(i)0 )⊕ Pcorek(i)1 (x
(i)
j ⊕ k(i)0 ⊕ δ) and
fD = Pcore
k
(i)
1 ⊕α
(y
(i)
j ⊕ k
′(i)
0 )⊕ Pcorek(i)1 ⊕α(y
(i)
j ⊕ k
′(i)
0 ⊕ δ).
We create encryption chains until fE reaches a distinguished point (resp. decryption chains
until fD reaches a distinguished point). We search for a collision between the encryption and
the decryption chain.
Let us consider two users, U1 and U2. Whenever the chains Ek(1)0 ,k(1)1 (x
(1)) andD
k
(2)
0 ,k
(2)
1 ⊕α
(y(2))
arrive at the same distinguished point, we suspect that these two chains have become parallel.
As the core of PRINCE is only parametrized by the key k1, when we arrive at the same dis-
tinguished point we obtain a probable collision between keys k
(1)
1 and k
(2)
1 ⊕ α used in Pcore.
However, we must verify that this is a real collision and not just a random incident. For this, we
verify that next points of fE and fD after reaching a distinguished point, continue to remain
equal. If we obtained a real collision we know that:
k
(1)
1 = k
(2)
1 ⊕ α.
This indicates that x(1) ⊕ y(2) is expected equal to k(1)0 ⊕ k
′(2)
0 . It is obvious that since k
(1)
1 =
k
(2)
1 ⊕ α we will also have k(1)1 ⊕ α = k(2)1 . This indicates that we also know k
′(1)
0 ⊕ k(2)0 .
Thus, we have:
k
(1)
0 ⊕ k
′(2)
0 = A and k
′(1)
0 ⊕ k(2)0 = B (∗).
Let {a63, . . . , a0} be the representation of the bits of k(1)0 and {b63, . . . , b0} the representation
of bits of k
(2)
0 . As, from the definition of PRINCE, k
′
0 = (k0≫ 1)⊕ (k0 ≫ 63), we have that:
k
′(1)
0 = {a0, a63, . . . , a2, a1 ⊕ a63} and k
′(2)
0 = {b0, b63, . . . , b2, b1 ⊕ b63}.
From (∗), we construct the system:
{a63, . . . , a0} ⊕ {b0, b63, . . . , b2, b1 ⊕ b63} = {A63, . . . , A0}
{b63, . . . , b0} ⊕ {a0, a63, . . . , a2, a1 ⊕ a63} = {B63, . . . , B0}
As this is an inversible linear system, we can easily find k
(1)
0 and k
(2)
0 . Note that once k
(i)
0
has been found, recovering k
(i)
1 can be done with an exhaustive search whose cost is 2
64.
Analysis of the attack. Once the computation of a chain is finished we have to store (xℓ−1, d, d+
1) where d is the distinguished point, xℓ−1 is the point before the chain reaches a distinguished
point and d + 1 is the point after the chain reached a distinguished point. We need to store
xℓ−1 as we have to test if the found collision is useful and we also need to store d+ 1 to test if
it is a real collision. If not, the search must continue.
As mentioned, PRINCE uses a 128-bit key which is split into two 64-bit parts, i.e. k = k0‖k1.
The attack consists in identifying and recovering all key material of a pair of users i and j for
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whom k
(i)
1 = k
(j)
1 ⊕ α. We expect to find a collision k(i)1 = k(j)1 ⊕ α between two different users
with high probability when the number of users will be at least 232. So the attack uses a set of
232 users and for each one we create 2 chains (encryption and decryption chain). The cost per
user is 232 operations and the total cost for recovering the keys k0 of 2 users is approximately
264 operations. For recovering k1, the cost of the exhaustive search is 2
64. So in total, we can
deduce both k0 and k1 in 2
65 operations.
4.3 Attack in the classical model
We show in this section that a classical attack that also uses the distinguished points technique
can also be possible. For this, we will create encryption chains from the function E defined in
section 4.2.
Precalculation. In the first phase of the attack, we aim to create encryption chains for every
possible key k
(i)
1 with 0 ≤ i < 264. More specifically, for every possible k(i)1 , we set k(i)0 = 0 and
we create for every (i) a chain Si from the function E with length 232. We store all chains Si.
Attack. Now, our purpose is to find a collision with one of the chains created with the zero
key k
(i)
0 . For this, for a random starting point x0 and for keys k0 and k1 we will calculate an
encryption chain T from the function E . The chain T will collide with high probability with one
of the chains Si. As described in previous section 4.2, when we detect a collision between two
distinguished points, we know that the chains had become parallel and so we obtain k
(i)
0 ⊕ k0.
As the key k
(i)
0 = 0, we finally obtain the unknown k0.
Analysis of the attack. For the precalculation phase, for every 264 possible keys we calculate
a chain with length 232 and so our complexity is equal to 296. As we need to store all chains,
the precalculation phase has also a cost of 264 in memory. However, once the first phase is
over, the attacker can perform the attack in only 232 operations as she has to calculate only
one chain. So, the total cost of the attack is 296. The proposed attack satisfies DT = 2128 as
D = 232 and T = 296. This attack does not improve the complexity of PRINCE given in [8]
and [16]. However, in our case, T is not the on-line time complexity as it corresponds to the
precalculation phase of the attack. Thus, in our attack, we have DTon = 2
64.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented new tradeoffs for public-key and symmetric-key cryptosystems
in the multi-user setting. We have introduced some algorithmic tools for collision-based attacks
using the distinguished point technique. The first tool allows to look for the discrete logarithm
of L users in parallel using only a O˜(
√
L) penalty using random graph process behaviour. The
second tool allows to achieve key-recovery of Even-Mansour and related ciphers and is a novel
lambda technique to find collisions when two different functions are involved. For the Even-
Mansour cipher, we show new tradeoffs that partially solve an open problem due to Dunkelman
et al. and we propose an analysis in the multi-user setting. Finally, for the PRINCE cipher,
we show generic attacks that improve the best published results in the sense that our time
complexity corresponds to a precomputation phase and not to an on-line phase. This last result
could also be adapted to similar ciphers such as DESX and would also improve on the best
previous attack.
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A Probabilistic Results
A.1 Random Graph Process
In this subsection, we recall the results on random graph processes that can be found in [7].
In the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph model G{n, Pr(edge) = p} (0 < p < 1), all graphs have vertex
set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} in which edges are chosen independently and with probability p. In other
words, if G0 is a graph with vertex set V and it has m edges, then
Pr({G0}) = Pr(G = G0) = pmqN−m,
where q = 1− p and N = (n2).
A random graph process on V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a Markov chain G˜ = (Gt)∞0 , whose states
are graphs on V . The process starts from the empty graph and for 1 ≤ t ≤ N the graph Gt is
obtained from Gt−1 by adding an edge, all new edges begin equiprobable (we do not pick an
edge that has been already chosen).
First of all, we give the result on the giant component
Theorem 1. Let c > 1 be a constant, t = ⌊cn/2⌋ and ω(n)→∞. Then, almost every Gt is the
union of the giant component, the small unicyclic components and the small tree components.
There are at most ω(n) vertices on the unicyclic components. The order of the giant component
L1(Gt) satisfies
|L1(Gt)− (1− t(c))n| ≤ ω(n)n1/2,
where
t(c) =
1
c
∞∑
k=1
kk−1
k!
(ce−c)k,
and for every fixed i ≥ 2∣∣∣Li(Gt)− (1/α)
(
log n− 5
2
log log n
)∣∣∣ ≤ ω(n),
where α = c− 1− log c.
If t = O(n log n), then the graph is almost certainly connected.
Theorem 2. For t = ⌊2n lnn⌋, we have
Pr[Gt is not connected] < n
−n/4.
We can find the expected value of t that makes the graph connected, and then apply tail
bounds to compute the probability for this happening for a particular t in the random graph
process. First notice that t ≥ n − 1 for a connected graph (a tree is a minimally-connected
graph). As we add edges, we watch the number of connected components of the graph. Initially,
the graph has n vertices and no edges, so there are n connected components. The first edge
always connects two points, and gives us n − 1 connected components. The second edge also
reduces the number of connected components to n − 2. The third may or may not reduce the
number. We use epochs to model the different phases of the process (at each epoch, the number
of connected components is the same). Let Xk be the number of random edges added while
there are k connected components, until there are k−1 connected components. We have shown
that Xn = 1 and Xn−1 = 1. If we define
X =
n∑
k=2
Xk,
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then X counts the total number of edges that we add until the graph is connected. Our goal
is to compute E(X). Now, define pk to be the probability that an edge added while there are
k components reduces the number of components. We cannot compute pk exactly, but we can
provide a lower bound. Assume that v is one edpoint of the edge we are adding. Then, there are
at least k − 1 other vertices to which we can connect v and reduce the number of components
(these other vertices lie on the other components). In total there are n − 1 other vertices to
which we can connect v. So the probability that this edge reduces the number of components
is ≥ (k − 1)/(n− 1). But this bound holds for any choice of v, so it also bounds pk:
pk ≥ k − 1
n− 1 .
Now, observe that Xk is a geometric random variable with success probability pk. Its expected
value is 1/pk ≤ (n− 1)/(k − 1). So we have
E(X) =
n∑
k=2
E(Xk) ≤
n∑
k=2
n− 1
k − 1 = (n− 1)Hn−1,
where Hn−1 is the (n − 1)st harmonic number. In other words, an upper bound on E(X) is
about n lnn.
The final step is to apply tail bounds on the probability of t being much larger than its
mean using Chebyshev or Chernoff bounds.
Using Chernoff bound, we can show that for δ < 2e− 1
Pr[X > (1 + δ)E(X)] < exp(−E(X)δ2/4),
which in the special case of δ = 1 leads to
Pr[X > 2n lnn] < n−n/4.
A.2 Birthday Paradox with Girls and Boys
Theorem 3. Let two sequences of size n1 (resp. n2), uniformly chosen at random and inde-
pendently in the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, then the expected number of collision is n1.n2/n.
B A survey of Existing Attacks on Even-Mansour
In this section, we recall previous attacks on the Even-Mansour cryptosystem and the open
problem of Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir as well as recast the attacks on Even-Mansour on
collision-based algorithms.
Daemen’s known-plaintext attack. The first attack uses two known plaintext/ciphertext pairs
(M0, C0) and (M1, C1). The adversary performs an exhaustive search on the value K1 and tests
whether π(M0⊕K)⊕π(M1⊕K) is equal to C0⊕C1. If this is the case then, K = K1 and since
the block length is equal to the key size we expect to have a constant number of candidates.
On average, this attack has a time complexity of T = N/2 where n = |K1| = |K2| and requires
two chosen plaintexts, D = 2.
Multi-user collisions and Applications 19
Daemen’s chosen-plaintext attack. The second attack is a T/M tradeoff of the previous attack.
The adversary asks the encryption of D chosen plaintexts pairs (Mi,M
′
i) such thatMi⊕M ′i = δ
a fixed value and receives the corresponding ciphertext pair (Ci0, C
i
1). Then, he store in a
hash table the value Mi at the index C
i
0 ⊕ Ci1. Finally, he computes for T values V the value
∆W = π(V ) ⊕ π(V ⊕ δ) and check whether this value is the index of a value in the hash
table. According to the birthday paradox, on average we expect to have one collision with high
probability as soon as DT = O(N) between the values ∆W and the values Ci0 ⊕ Ci1. Such a
collision gives us a solution for the key K1 as K1 =Mi ⊕ V or K1 =Mi ⊕ V ⊕ δ. The memory
complexity of this attack is min(T,D). But, in practice we usually have D ≤ T since memory
is a more scarce resource than time.
Biryukov-Wagner Slide attack. About ten years later, Biryukov and Wagner discovered the
slide attack to break an arbitrarily number of rounds. Their technique can be adapted to the
Even-Mansour cipher using a twist in the classical attack. Their attack has a complexity in
D = N1/2 known plaintexts and T = N1/2 called to π. A slid pair is a pair of messages (P, P ′)
such that
P ⊕ P ′ = K1.
Then, it is easy to see that we have the following condition for the slid pair:
Π(P )⊕ π(P ) = Π(P ′)⊕ π(P ′). (1)
The idea of the attack is that in a set of D = N1/2 plaintexts, we can construct N pairs
and there is at least one slid pair on average among them. Consequently, we can check the
condition (1) by searching a collision between the values Π(P )⊕ π(P ). A collision between the
pair (Pi, Pj) will give us the two key candidates K1 = Pi ⊕ Pj and K2 = Π(Pi)⊕Π(Pj). The
time complexity of this attack is T = N1/2 and the memory requirement is M = N1/2.
Slidex attack on the Two-Key Even-Mansour. The attack for the two-key EM scheme is a gen-
eralization of the advanced sliding attack of [6] where Dunkelman et al. introduce an additional
degree of freedom ∆ and is called the Slidex attack. In this attack, we assume that we have a
slid pair which satisfies the property
P ⊕ P ′ = K1 ⊕∆
for some ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n. For this plaintext pair, we have
Π(P ) = π(P ⊕K1)⊕K2 = π(P ′ ⊕∆)⊕K2
Π(P ′) = π(P ′ ⊕K1)⊕K2 = π(P ⊕∆)⊕K2
and so the following slid pair condition is satisfied
Π(P )⊕ π(P ⊕∆) = Π(P ′)⊕ π(P ′ ⊕∆).
This allows to mount an attack for any value D ≤ N . First of all, the adversary calls D = 2d/2
times the EM scheme to get the known plaintext encryptions Pi, Π(Pi). Then, for each of 2
n−d
arbitrary values for ∆ he stores the value i in a hash table indexed by Π(Pi) ⊕ π(Pi ⊕ ∆)
and searches for a slid pair in the hash table by checking the slid pair condition. Then each
collision between (Pi, Pj) with ∆k will give key candidates K1 = Pi ⊕ Pj ⊕ ∆k and K2 =
Π(Pi)⊕π(Pj⊕∆k). This is a known-plaintext attack which works for any value D < N1/2. We
will see later that one problem with this attack is that it is not possible to use precomputation.
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C A reminder of distinguished points methods
Given a function f on a set S of size N , distinguished points methods allow to find collisions
in a very flexible way. We first define a distinguished subset S0 in S, using any efficiently
testable property. The basic idea is, starting from a random point x0 in S to construct chains
of computations by evaluating the sequence xi+1 = f(xi) until we encounter a distinguished
point, i.e. an element of S0. The average length of such chains is ℓ = |S|/|S0|. Note that to
avoid degenerate cases, it is useful to abort the computation of chains which do not reach a
distinguished point after c0 · ℓ steps, where c0 > 1 is a fixed constant. Indeed, the proportion of
points which satisfy the distinguishing property is 1/ℓ. Then, the length of the chains is ℓ on
average. If we compute chains of length c0 · ℓ, then the proportion of chains that exceeds this
value is (1− 1/ℓ)c0ℓ ≈ exp(−c0). Values such as c0 = 20 are often recommended [26]. Since the
number of aborted chains is 20 times larger than the average, the proportion of aborted work
is approximately 20e−20 < 5 · 10−8.
Once the computation of a chain is finished, we store a summary of the chain (x0, ℓx0 , dx0)
containing the starting point x0, the number of iterations ℓx0 and the distinguished endpoint
dx0 . The most important property of chains is that two chains which pass through a common
point necessarily end at the same distinguished point. The converse is almost true, two chains
that end at the same distinguished point are merging at some point (and thus yield a collision)
unless one of the two chains is a subchain of the other.
When building chains, an essential safety measure is to avoid computing many times the
same thing. For example, it is useless to aim at computing chains of length larger than N1/2,
because we expect such chains to cycle. Even if we make chains shorter, this can become a
problem. Typically, when constructing B different chains of average length ℓ, we should always
ensure that B · ℓ2 do not grow beyond N [17]. Otherwise, we expect too many early mergings
of the final chains into their predecessors. Collisions between 2-sets can be analyzed using
Theorem 3 in Appendix.
D A reminder of Hellman’s Time/Memory tradeoff
Hellman’s algorithm is a method to invert a function f : S → S in time T = N2/3 and memory
M = N2/3 with precomputation time P = N where N = |S|. The idea is to use m starting
points and iterate f t times for each starting point to compute the ending points. We store the
m starting and ending points in a hash table indexed by the ending points. A table represents
a covering of mt points among the N values. If we try to invert a value y covered in the table,
we iterate f from y until f (i)(y) is in the set of ending points. Now, from the corresponding
starting point, we iterate f until we reach y and the previous value gives the preimage. The
on-line time complexity is t if we test membership in the set of ending points using a hash table.
The memory is reduced to m if we omit the log factors.
The matrix stopping rule is t · mt ≤ N since if we add a new line in the table, we will
get a collision with one point of the m previous lines with probability t · (mt)/N according
to Appendix A.2. Moreover, since colliding points will not add points to the coverage, a table
cannot contain more than mt2 ≤ N points. However, a table covers only mt points among
the N values and then, from the matrix stopping rule, we cover at most a fraction 1/t of the
N points. To increase this value, Hellman’s idea is to use t independent tables with a related
function fi. Now, the memory is mt and the on-line time complexity is mt since we need to
iterate m different functions and test membership. If we fix t = m = N1/3, then we obtain the
announced complexity and the precomputation needs to cover the whole space N .
